Indian Spectrum Auctions — Unraveling the Key Distortions
How did it all happen? Who contributed? The Result— A less competitive market.
A few days back, I published an application that is equipped with the capability to look into the details of all past auctions in India (round by round) since 2010. The app renders its output as user-friendly charts — unlocking the story in depth, which otherwise is impossible to perceive by just looking at the raw data. The key benefit of anchoring this data in a menu-driven application is that it gives the readers the opportunity to experience the bidding process firsthand and see for themselves how it all happened— some bidders were totally reckless, and others played the game with the intention of imposing more cost on their opponents. Unfortunately for us, the regulators stood helpless, as their hands were tied to their backs. Why? The culprit was the adverse public perception of “causing harm to the exchequer” caused by the 2G Scam. The purpose of this note is to discuss these facts in sequence so as to enable the users to navigate through the data embedded in the app and see for themselves how auctions in India inadvertently contributed towards more costs on some selected few and played a decisive role towards limiting competition by raising the barrier to market entry. But before I begin this story, a word of caution! This note will get longer than usual, as without that flexibility, it will not be possible for me to do justice to such a complex and difficult topic. So please bear with me.
2010 — 3G Auctions
The distortion that took place during the 3G auction is clearly visible in the chart embedded in the app (reproduced below).
Menu -> Dimension (Auction Data)>Feature(2010-Band2100)>SubFeature (BidsCircleWise)
Looking at this chart one can see that Aircel whose bidding intensity was higher or at par with others (especially in Delhi and Mumbai), failed to win airwaves in these circles. Then Bharti lost 9 of the 22 circles, that too after having bid with intensity at par with the winners. Strangely, Tata (without a 2G license in Delhi) kept bidding till the penultimate round (182) and lost. Why was this strange? Reason — Tata did not have a 2G license in Delhi, and their securing a 3G license without underlay 2G here was totally meaningless, and still, they kept bidding till the penultimate round, why?
As a result of these distortions, the prices of Delhi and Mumbai increased to a disproportionate level. Now this is clearly visible from the fact that during that period, Delhi and Mumbai contributed to just 18% of the total industry revenues, but the bidders were willing to pay a value that was 40% of the total auction outflows. Why?
You can see this unusual price increase by diving down into the app here.
Menu → Dimension (Auction Data)>Feature(2010-Band2100)>SubFeature (ProvWinningBid)>PWB Type>End CLK Round>Option> ReservePrice Multiple
The Cause
The cause of this desperate/reckless bidding was nothing close to rocket science. The foundation of this disaster was laid when the market was seeded with 2G players at a heavily subsidized cost (2008–2009). And why would these players not make a desperate attempt to win a 3G license when we all know that 2G without an overlay of 3G made no business sense? The second cause was the deliberate design of the auction that mandated positive bidding at every round, irrespective of whether a bidder was a “Provisional Winner” in the earlier round. As already discussed that the auction came to an end only when Bharti made the supreme sacrifice of letting go of 9 circles of the 22 (some key ones like Punjab, Gujarat, and Maha). To prevent the pain from becoming unbearable, else the auction would have continued (the auction was designed to end if and only if the excess demand was zero or negative simultaneously in all the circles), thereby causing further price escalations across all circles.
2010 — BWA Auctions
The story of the BWA auctions is similar to that of 3G but with a difference. In this auction, Infotel (later acquired by RJIO) ended up bidding at a much higher intensity than was needed. In other words, even if Infotel chose not to bid in all 22 circles from the beginning, it still would have retained its ability to win all of them by the time auction ended. By bidding at a higher intensity, it just paid more than what was required. This was completely unnecessary. Please note that the Indian spectrum auctions are set such that in the initial rounds, the bidder has the option to just bid 80% of the total assigned points (points are similar to the chips in the casino, which later can be later traded with cash in return for ownership of airwaves, and higher the number of the points that you start with, the more empowered you become to bid in different circles). Then as the auction reaches a stage of maturity (activity factor set to 100%), the bidder has no choice but to put all its points on the table if it wants to keep them (points) alive in the subsequent rounds, i.e. to preserve its bidding capability.
The reference to this can be easily unlocked by examining the “points in play” for this auction available here in the app.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2010-Band2300) > SubFeature (BiddingActivity) > Option (Total Pts in Play)
The maximum number of points that the bidder needed to bid in all the circles was 350. Now the activity factor stayed at 80% till Rd No. 65 when it was raised to 90%. And then at Rd No. 82, it was raised to 100%. This means Infotel was required to bid just 280 points till Rd No 65, and then 315 till Rd No 82 when it was raised to 100%. But Infotel kept bidding at the full 350 points from Rd No. 1, i.e. the start of the auction (see the heatmap above). Why? We have no answer. This caused the price of all circles to increase unnecessarily than what was required to make a win.
2012– 800, 1800 MHz Auctions
Now the key distortion in this auction was the use of an unusually high pricing reference that emerged out of the 3G auction of 2010. This prevented the regulator from bringing down the price to an attractive level for the bidders — resulting in subdued bidding. The 800 MHz saw no bids even when its reserve price was set only slightly above — just 1.086 times than the 3G auction for the year 2010. And this should be seen as a huge discount, given the fact 800 MHz band had a much better propagation characteristic. Setting such a low RP can be considered outside the norms that the TRAI had been practicing to date. The price of the 1800 MHz band was set still lower at 53.7% of the 3G auction price, even when its propagation is better than the 3G band of 2100 MHz. And in spite of all these reductions a large quantum of spectrum remained unsold — which points to the fact that even at these prices, for the bidders, the spectrum wasn’t that attractive.
The references to this low-intensity bidding are visible in the following three charts. First provides a snapshot of the excess demand for all the circles in these 14 rounds.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2012-Band1800) > SubFeature (DemandActivity) > Option (Excess Demand)
Now “Excess Demand” is nothing but netting the supply from the actual demand. A total of 8 slots (each of size 1.25 MHz) were up for grabs. Can you see the circles and where there were positive excess demands? Hardly any — Expect of Bihar, UPW, and UPE. It goes without saying all (except Bihar) went at the Reserve Price.
The second chart points to the fact that a huge quantum of airwaves went unsold.
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2012) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Percent Unsold)
100% of the spectrum in 800 MHz was left unsold, along with a significant proportion in the 1800 MHz band.
Thirdly, the players who bid and took the bulk of the airwaves, did so out of compulsion, as they were trying to bail themselves out of the situation that emanated from the cancellation of their 2G license by the SC’s verdict. See under.
Telenor, whose licenses were canceled for all the 22 circles ended by taking airwaves in just 6, and Videocon took spectrum in 7 out of 22 circles. Bharti stayed out, but to no avail, as later it ended by buying (through a secondary sale) all the spectrum acquired by Telenor and Videocon. And this points to the fact that the valuation of airwaves when northwards with each passing year.
The Cause
The main reason for these distortions was the 2G scam. The public perception of the 2G scam is — a HUGE loss of revenue to the exchequer. Actually, at that time loss was very insignificant, but the real loss happened after the scam, in the form of the destruction of the regulator's ability to do course corrections. The fear of causing harm to the exchequer was so immense that the regulator failed to intervene. As a result, with each auction, these distortions kept accumulating, thereby inadvertently helping the market leaders with the leverage to drive the weaker players out of business and raise the barrier to entry for new players. Also, a few lucky ones got an opportunity to leverage the auctions to impose higher costs of ownership on their competitors. We will measure how much was this impact in follow-up sections in this note. So please read on.
2014– 900 MHz Auctions
This was a combined auction of the 900 & 1800 MHz bands. In 900 MHz, airwaves was offered in only 3 circles — Delhi, Mumbai & Kolkata (Metros whose 2G license were expiring). Here I will like to take the opportunity of commending the regulator for setting a reserve price for Delhi at 54%, Mumbai at 50%, and Kolkata at 114% of the 3G auction price. But it did not help in containing the final price due to reasons that will become apparent subsequently.
Let’s start the discussion by referring to the chart which captures the total bidding by the operators within the 68 rounds.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2014-Band900) > SubFeature (BidCircleWise) > Option (Absolute Values)
What do you see from the chart above? RJIO has made 8 bids in Delhi, and 9 in Mumbai but could not win spectrum. Tata has made 7 bids in Kolkata, and 6 bids in Mumbai, and also lost. But this does not tell the full story. And for unlocking this further, one needs to look at this from other angles — described in the following chart (which has embedded text in each cell = Last Bid Value/Blocks Selected[BS] in the 68th Round/Blocks Assigned[BA] at the end of 68th round).
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2014-Band900) > SubFeature (LastBidPrice) > Option (End of Round) > Filter Winners
The above chart tells us that RJIO kept bidding in Delhi till the price of this LSA got raised from Rs 360 Cr/MHz to Rs 472.5 Cr/MHz (1.31 times the RP). And in Mumbai, RJIO left the auction only when its price got raised from Rs 328 Cr/MHz to Rs 546.6 Cr/ MHz (1.67 times the RP). Delhi finally was taken at 2.06 times the RP, and Mumbai at 1.73 times the RP(Reserve Price) by Bharti, Voda, and Idea. Similarly, Tata kept bidding in Kolkata till its price got raised to 1.47 times RP, and Mumbai till its price was at 1.44 times RP.
Hence, we can conclude that both RJIO and Tata contributed to raising the price of the 900 MHz band significantly that too when it was not their primary band of interest. Actually, they had the option of skipping this band totally and focusing only on the 1800 MHz. But they chose not to, thereby raising the ownership cost of this band significantly for Bharti, Vodafone, and Idea.
But, apart from RJIO and Tata, the incumbents (Bharti, Vodafone, and Idea) also tried to outbid each other in order to grab as much airwave as possible — in the process raising the price further.
The Cause
In my view, the incumbent players were as much responsible for this outcome— which resulted in such an uncomfortable situation for them to manage. The foundation of this mess was laid in 2002/03 with the entry of Reliance in the telecom fray using CDMA technology. The situation turned controversial, enraging the GSM players. This motivated them to continue advocating the assignment of spectrum through the administrative route, thereby successfully preventing the CDMA players from unlocking their data capabilities (CDMA was given 50% of airwaves as compared to their GSM counterpart, it being an efficient technology).
Regulators played along, which was surprising, given the fact — penalizing technologies for their efficiencies is a practice which nothing short of “Perverse”, and has never been practiced anywhere else in the world, and that too with such impunity as we did in India.
Now when we go against the established norms, we should be also ready to face the consequences. And so we did. The then telecom minister (A Raja) took full advantage of this situation, and since auctions (as a means of assignment) were not supported by the GSM players (due to reasons explained above), he got the opportunity to misuse the current policy and subsidized the entry of new players. This resulted in increased demand for the 3G spectrum — resulting in reckless bidding in 2010. The high price of the 3G spectrum provided a wrong reference for evaluating the loss in the 2G Scam, thereby triggering the SC case — leading to the cancellation of the license, and a huge public outcry against the government for causing harm to the exchequer), which finally culminated in tying the hands of the regulator. Hence, the expiring GSM licenses were not renewed (though there was a provision) — resulting in the renewal auctions — which provided an excellent opportunity for the competitors to raise the cost of ownership of the GSM players by bidding in this band without the intention of buying spectrum, as the risk of getting suck (while going so) was close to zero.
2014– 1800 MHz Auctions
Now let's discuss the 1800 MHz band. The reserve price for this band was set lower than the 2012 RP by a factor of 0.63 (37% lower). However, the final Pan-India auction price ended up a little higher at a factor of 0.81 (19% lower than the 2012 RP). This means — this band saw some level of competitive bidding and price discovery, but not at all circles. Now in order for us to explore the details, we need to dive into the chart that captures the final auction price as a multiple of the reserve price to understand what happened during the bidder.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2014-Band1800) > SubFeature (ProvWinningBid) > PWB Type (End CLK Round) > Option (ReservePrice Multiple)
One can clearly see that the price increased only in those circles where the supply was much lower than the demand (bottom captures blocks for sale each of size 0.2 MHz). Delhi and Mumbai were an exception, as these saw natural demand due to operators looking at alternative options due to the huge pressure of demand in the 900 MHz band.
And in spite of this demand, a large percentage of airwaves was left unsold as described in the following chart.
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2014) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Percent Unsold)
The Cause
Most of the distortions and their causes are similar to that of the 900 MHz band as explained above. But with an additional one. Please note the incumbents were desperate to win back their 900 MHz spectrum. That they did this in spite of the fact that they had an opportunity to win an additional spectrum in the 1800 MHz band. This means that the 1800 MHz band could not act as a full replacement for the 900 MHz in this renewal auction — giving a huge opportunity for their competitors to bid with immunity in the 900 MHz band without the intent of winning airwaves, but just to raise the cost on them.
2015– 900 MHz Auctions
This year saw a blood bath in this band as a result of a surgical strike by the competitors to inflict more pain on the incumbents whose licenses were expiring. This is clearly visible by referencing the following charts.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2015-Band900) > SubFeature (BidsCircleWise) > Option (Absolute Values)
What do you see? RJIO bid at par with incumbents in Rajasthan, and with higher intensity in UPE and UPW, and still lost. Doesn’t it sound strange? And on top of this, most of this intense bidding took place at the flag end of the auction (between Rd No 88 & 115), and therefore the question is — Why would anyone bid with such intensity, that too at the maturity of the auction process if he did not want to win? The only logical reason is to raise the ownership cost for the incumbents as they had no choice but to win these circles back, or else they would have gone out of business.
This intense bidding raised the price of these circles to unrealistic levels — clearly visible from the chart below.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2015-Band900) > SubFeature (ProvWinningBid) > PWB Type (End CLK Round) > Option (ReservePrice Multiple)
One can clearly see that due to the above action, the price of Rajasthan, UPE, and UPW went up insanely high — by 3.6, 3.4, and 4.3 times the reserve price. Also, since the supply was low in these circles, it provided an excellent ground for such offensive action without having to face the risk of getting stuck. In the rest of the circles, the prices did increase but were nothing close compared to the above three.
The Cause
The cause of this debacle is similar to what I mentioned while describing the 2014’s 900 MHz renewal auctions but with a little tactical difference. RJIO’s bidding in RA, UPE, and UPW can also be attributed due to their frustration of not being able to contain the increase in price in three key circles in the 800 MHz band — AP, Delhi, and Maharashtra in the flag end of the auctions. And, in the end, RJIO lost in all these three circles to TATA. And why did they lose, will become clear when we discuss the 800 MHz band, so please read on.
It is worth noting that the story of the 900 MHz band got almost over with the 2015 auction as very little spectrum was taken thereafter. The following chart provides a snapshot.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (900) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Qualtum Sold)
Hence, it really did not really matter what prices were set in this band in the later years. Though it is a different matter, prices were set at levels almost at par with the year 2015 till 2021, until they got reduced in the year 2022. See under.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (900) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Reserve Price)
2015– 800 MHz Auctions
Background
Except for the auctions of 2010 — which was sequential, all other auctions (since 2012) were held simultaneously for all bands put together. In this type of auction, the bidders have the option of switching bands (between rounds) provided the points held by it at any point in time allowed them that capability. In other words, it was possible to switch between bands/circles with similar EMD (earnest money deposit) values (these values are embedded in the app). Now, due to historical reasons, every operator had a preference for a particular band. For TATA and RJIO, it is the 800 MHz band, and for Bharti, Vodafone & Idea it is 900 MHz. Now, RJIO after having acquired the BWA spectrum in the 2300 MHz band, and a large quantum in the 1800 MHz band (in earlier auctions) — still was not fully empowered to launch services as the radio waves in these high frequencies have poor propagation characteristics compared to low-frequency bands like 800, 900 MHz band. Hence, it desperately needed access to one of these lower frequency bands. For RJIO, 800 MHz became a natural choice as it provided them with an opportunity to share airwaves with RCOM. Tata also had an interest in this band, it being an incumbent operator here due to its legacy CDMA operations.
Tata’s Advantage
In this auction, Tata focussed all its energy on 5 of the 22 circles. These were — AP, Delhi, Haryana, Maharashtra, and Mumbai. Now, all these circles were also desired by RJIO too. But the auction rules were set such that it inadvertently tilted the balance in favor of Tata — not because the regulator wanted to favor Tata but because of the way the auction bidding rules were set up. Tata being an incumbent player was allowed to bid in chunks of 1.25 MHz (one block), whereas RJIO (a new entrant) had no option but to bid at least 4 blocks (5 MHz) or all of it if less than 4 blocks were offered.
RJIO’s Frustration
In AP 5 blocks were offered for sale, and in Delhi and Maha 3 blocks each. Tata was bidding 3 slots in AP, 1 in Delhi, and 2 in Maha. RJIO has no choice but to bid 4 in AP, and 3 each in Delhi and Maha. Hence, RJIO’s total value of bids in these circles was much higher than that of Tata. RJIO kept trying hard till Rd No 88 to outbid Tata and then got so frustrated that it switched all its points from these three circles to 900 MHz band RA, UPE, and UPW — resulting in an exponential rise in prices in these circles.
Readers can refer to the following charts to experience this story by themselves.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2015-Band800) > SubFeature (BidsCircleWise) > Option (Absolute Values)
RJIO bid 33, 28, and 36 times in AP, DL, and MA compared to Tata’s 35, 27, and 26 and lost.
Dimension (Auction Data) > Feature (2015-Band800) > SubFeature (ProvWinningBid) > PWB Type (End CLK Round) > Option (ReservePrice Multiple)
One can see that AP, DL, and MA prices increased to 2.6, 1.4, and 2.4 times the reserve price. But this is way less compared to what we saw in the 900 MHz band for RA, UPE, and UPW.
The Cause
Again, most of the causes we discussed earlier in this note apply in this case as well. However, here I will like to mention that it is the regulator’s responsibility to design the auction such that no bidder can exercise undue leverage over other bidder’s weaknesses. Turning a blind eye to this principle is a recipe for disaster — resulting in some players getting disadvantaged at the cost of others in their ability to access the same/similar bands. For example, RJIO was disadvantaged compared to Tata in the 800 MHz. Likewise, the GSM players lacked leverage in the 900 MHz band, due to the threat of loss of business if they fail to retain some spectrum.
Regulator’s Options
But what options were available before the regulator? a) Setting the same rules as regards the minimum number of slots required to bid for both incumbents and new players, the best way to implement this is to raise the minimum block size that a bidder can possibly bid; b) Never auction small slices of spectrum. The Golden Rule is — Either find more, and if not possible then DO NOT Auction. c) Reduce the frequency of auctions, and not have auctions planned for every year, as not only it creates confusion but leads to fragmentation. d) Realign renewal auctions such that most participating in the bidding process face similar situations. So that no surgical stricks are possible without attaching significant risks/consequences to the attacker. Etc.
It is worth mentioning here that most of the 800 MHz spectrum got acquired in 2021, just like 2015 for the 900 MHz band. See under.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (800) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Quantum Sold)
Hence, it did NOT matter what reserve price the regulator had set for this band in the subsequent years. This is captured in the chart below.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (800) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Reserve Price)
Who Benefited — 900 vs 800?
This discussion is important as we know that the market is split between two sets of operators, and both sets have different interests as regards these two bands. 800 MHz band is primarily held by RJIO and 900 MHz by Bharti and VI. Hence, it will be interesting to compare the per/MHz auction price of these two bands when the maximum quantum of airwaves in these bands was taken, i.e. in CY 2015 for 900 MHz and in CY 2021 for 800 MHz. In order to drive an apples-to-apples comparison let's do the comparison in USD (a currency which till 2021 had very low inflation). See charts under.
It is clear from the above chart that a HUGE cost that got imposed on Bharti, Vodafone, and Idea compared to RJIO. Now the question to ponder is — was this a fair and desirable outcome? And was it not the responsibility of the regulators to see through this and intervene, so that bands that are of similar nature did not sell at significantly different prices? Think about it, and let me know in the comments.
2100 vs 1800 MHz Auctions — Impact on Operators
Now at this point, it will be useful to measure the impact on the operators, who chose to acquire 3G spectrum in the year 2010 vs those who focussed only on the 1800 MHz band.
Note that most of the 3G spectrum (2100 MHz) actually got sold in the year 2010. See the chart below.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (2100) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Quantum Sold)
And for the 1800 MHz band, it got sold in the year subsequent years, but a majority in the year 2014. See the chart below.
Dimension (Spectrum Bands) > Band (1800) > Feature (Auction Map) > SubFeature (Quantum Sold)
Hence comparing the auction prices in USD in these two years — CY 2010 for the 2100 MHz band (3G) and CY 2014 for 1800 MHz will provide us with a fair benchmark (on what the impact was) as we did for the 800/900 MHz bands earlier. See the chart below.
It is clearly evident from this comparison, that those operators who focussed all their energy only in the 1800 MHz band (like RJIO) got hugely advantaged compared to those who tried to acquire 3G spectrum in the year 2010. This also proves how wrong it was to link the valuation of the 3G spectrum of 2010 for calculating loss to the exchequer due to the 2G scam.
Spectrum Auctions — CY 2016 to 2022
Now from now on, the complexity of this story reduces significantly, as all these distortions were too much for some weaker players to sustain. Hence, they got driven out of business. The volatility of the spectrum prices started to reduce, and so is the process of “market price discovery”. This was on account of two reasons — a) The regulator started putting out all the inventory available with them; b) Even if a fraction of it (airwaves) got sold the price was held tight in the next round, as it fell within the regulator’s definition of “market discovery”.
As a result — Auctions virtually turned into a process of “Administrative Assignment” — at the price which was set up by the regulator (there was no market discovery), and to those players who can afford it (the rest could not sustain and were driven out).
2016 Auctions
The readers can refer to the following charts to verify the conclusion as stated above.
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2016) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Percent Unsold)
Can you see most of the spectrum offered remained unsold?
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2016) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Auction/Reserve)
Can you count the number of circles where the price has gone above the reserve price? You will see this situation worsening as you evaluate the last two years — 2021 & 2022.
2021 Auctions
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2021) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Percent Unsold)
Can you see the worsening situation as regards a large quantum of airwaves getting wasted as unsold?
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2021) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Auction/Reserve)
Can you find a single circle where there was a market price discovery? Virtually None- All got sold at the reserve price. In that case, can you call this an auction, or an administrative assignment at the price set by the regulator?
2022 Auctions
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2022) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Percent Unsold)
Here the story is not much different, most of the spectrum remained unsold, whatever you see as “sold” is due to the pressure from the govt to start 5G service (700, 3500, 26000 MHz Bands).
Dimension (Auction Years) > Year (2022) > Feature (Band Metric) > SubFeature (Auction/Reserve)
And whatever got sold, all of it was at the reserve price set by the regulator.
Conclusions
It is clear from the above discussion that Indian spectrum auctions have inadvertently got converted into a process of “administrative assignment” at a price determined by the regulator. The process of “price discovery” — a main feature of any auction process, is totally absent. The barrier to entry has been held so high, as no one other than the existing players can dare to participate. As an outcome, the “market competitiveness” has got seriously compromised.
The current situation works fantastic for even those incumbents who got disadvantaged due to regulatory inaction during the past process and has been able to survive. Why? Any increase in market competitiveness forces the players to be more efficient and productive in order to stay in business, and if the market stays closed, then the value can still get generated even with very little effort. Because the consumers are locked in and have no options (alternatives). Hence, it is natural to expect the beneficiaries of this process to support “auctions” as the mechanism of assignment of spectrum in all situations. Even when it virtually makes no economic/technical sense — like the assignment of spectrum for satellite services.
It is high time for the government to realize the current situation and make necessary corrections. Gunning for auctions as the only process of assignment makes no sense, just because one can prevent themselves from the criticism of favoritism and causing “loss to the exchequer”. On the contrary, more harm is caused to the interest of the consumers, by not doing anything to correct this situation. The Sooner, we realize this fact, the better it will be for India and its people.
The link to the application from where these charts have been extracted is here — https://paragkar-spectrummaps.streamlit.app/
(Disclaimer — No one funded me to write this note and hence there is no conflict of interest)
